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Abstract 
This paper applies nonparametric estimators to examine the effect of regional quality of 
government on the environmental performance in the NUTS 1-regions in France, Germany 
and the UK. The most comprehensive existing regional measure on governance is used, 
gauging the partiality, corruption and effectiveness of government services in each region. By 
utilizing regional level measures of three pollutants (CO2, CH4 and N2O) the effect of 
governance on environmental efficiency is analyzed. The empirical analysis suggests that 
there is a nonlinear relationship between regions’ governance quality levels and their 
environmental performance. It appears that the effect of regional quality of governance is 
positive up to a certain level, then turning slightly negative. This suggests that higher 
governance quality will not always result in increased environmental efficiency. 
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1. Introduction  
A burgeoning literature has in the last decades studied how the design of governance 
affects environmental outcomes, focusing on the role of constitutions, legal systems, degree 
of democratization and other institutional features of countries mode of governance. Besides 
the attention on the formal design of government institutions there has also been a wide 
concern among scholars and policymakers that quality of government – the extent to which 
the state is infested by corruption and partiality – has an impact on environmental outcomes 
since this affect the formulation and implementation of environmental policies (e.g. Damania 
et al. 2004; López & Mitra 2000).          
While the massive number of empirical studies on this topic certainly has not 
reached a consensus, the majority of this research largely contends that there are negative 
effects from corruption on different measures of environmental performance. However, we 
have identified a gap in this body of research and argue that it is problematic that an absolute 
majority of these studies only use national-level variables as empirical measures of 
governance and environmental outcomes.  
Although exceptions exist, as some recent studies focus on one subnational unit or 
different units within a country (e.g. Golden and Min 2013; Halkos and Tzeremes 2013a), few 
studies have, to date, analyzed regional differences across countries in a comparative 
perspective. Barrett and colleagues (2006) argue that the debate on whether or not corruption 
has a negative impact on environmental performance has been limited by the focus on 
countries as the unit of analysis: “Researchers employing the conventional model [of 
corruption and environmental outcomes] have thus far focused on national-level political 
corruption, which is understandable. Data availability sharply limits analysts’ ability to study 
these phenomena at smaller scales. //… [Yet] given all the possible subnational variation in 
resource characteristics and quality of governance, a single measure of corruption at the 
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national level seems highly unlikely to capture whatever true relationship(s) might exist 
between corruption and resource outcomes” (p. 1359). 
We pick up this point and focus in this article, in contrast to previous studies on 
corruption and the environment, on regions as this limit the risk of ecological fallacies when 
making inferences only based on national values. To account for the role of economic 
development we focus in this study on environmental efficiency, broadly understood as the 
relationship between desirable economic output and undesirable ecological output (i.e. 
pollution). The aim of our article is more specifically to examine the effect of French, German 
and U.K. NUTS level 1 regions’ governance quality on their environmental efficiency levels.  
Recently Halkos and Tzeremes (2013a) introduced an application of the model 
proposed by Färe and Grosskopf (2004) based on the probabilistic characterization of a 
directional distance function (Simar and Vanhems, 2012). In our case we apply the same 
approach in order to measure the effect of government quality on regions environmental 
performance. More precisely we apply nonparametric estimators to examine the effect of 
regional quality of government on the environmental performance in 36 regions. We use the 
European Quality of Government Index (EQI), the most comprehensive existing measure on 
subnational governance. The index gauges the partiality, corruption and effectiveness of 
government services in each region. By utilizing regional level measures of three pollutants 
(CO2, CH4 and N2O) we construct sub-national environmental efficiency indicators and 
analyze the effect of governance on environmental performance.  
The article proceeds as follows: The following section reviews the theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings regarding the impact from governance on environmental 
outcomes. After describing our datasets in section 3 we discuss the statistical methods 
employed in section 4. We then present the empirical results in section 5. We conclude by 
discussing the implications of our study and outlining a future research agenda. 
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2. Literature review  
Several veins of research have focused on the impact from different institutional 
designs of governance on environmental outcomes. One literature examines the effect from 
the degrees of democracy in a country and constitutional arrangements on environmental 
measures (see Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007 as well as Li and Reuveny 2006 for useful 
reviews). Other authors have studied the role played by different legal systems (see for 
example Meiners and Yandle 1998) and the composition and size of government (e.g. 
Bernauer and Koubi 2012) on environmental outcomes.  
Also, there has been a wide focus on bad governance and the presence of bribery and 
corruption within government, the issue at focus in this article.1 Corruption and low quality of 
government was anecdotally mentioned as being present where the environment is 
deteriorating in some early studies (e.g. Carter 1997; Hafner 1998; Sapru 1998; Lippe 1999) 
and described as “a major culprit in environmental degradation” (Desai 1998:300). Since then 
a large body of research has emerged that investigates the effect from corruption on 
environmental outcomes.  
Bad governance in general and in particular the presence of corrupt government 
institutions is described in the theoretical literature to have a negative influence on the 
environment. López and Mitra (2000) model this relationship and argue that the inverted U-
shaped relationship between pollution and per capita income is affected by corruption. 
According to their theoretical analysis, the turning point where the slope of this curve starts to 
decline takes place at later stages of income in economies where corruption is present. 
Damania (2002) develop a theoretical model where pollution abatement is affected negatively 
by corruption.  
                                                        
1 When discussing corruption we understand this concept according to its most commonly used definition, the 
”abuse of public power for private gain” (Treisman 2007). 
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More specifically, the literature theoretically assumes that corruption affect 
environmental performance and natural resource management negatively through two causal 
processes: One is focused on that corruption affects the substantial stringency of 
environmental policy, as bribery and lobbying directed towards decision-makers shape the 
formulation of environmental regulations in corrupt societies (Damania et al. 2003:492; 
Fredriksson & Svenson 2003:1385; Fredriksson et al. 2004:208; Welsch 2004:685).
 
Another 
explanation instead focuses on that corruption hampers law enforcement and compliance – 
allowing emitters to evade responsibility or violators to avoid sanctions through bribery to 
public officials – and thus tend to encourage pollution or overexploitation (Robbins 2000:427; 
Messer 2000:55; Esty et al. 2005:304; Smith & Walpole 2007:251-252; Leader-Williams et 
al. 2009:297; Miller 2011:51). The former argument has also been theoretically developed to 
include other actors, indicating that corruption can be a facilitating mechanism for 
environmental lobbyists.  
Fredriksson et al. (2007) argues that there is a positive effect on the probability of 
ratification of environmental agreements from the intensity of environmental lobbying and 
that this effect is increased from levels of corruption, where lobbyists have a greater influence 
on decisions. So if corruption opens up possibilities for influence by both industry and 
environmental lobbyists, then why would we expect corruption to result in adverse effects on 
the environment? A literature focused on how certain environmental regulations are 
formulated develops an argument that can be useful to understand this question: “This 
argument is based on the view that industry is able to exert its preference for a particular 
instrument because it is more likely to be wellorganized than consumers” (Hahn 1990:23). 
According to this reasoning corruption could very well increase the possibilities for lobbying 
to both industry and environmental actors, but it is the former who will have the relatively 
larger influence in the end over the formulation of policy. 
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The empirical findings lend support for these arguments but also make visible some 
existing controversies. A wide body of research has demonstrated a pattern where national 
levels of corruption is said to affect numerous measures of environmental outcomes. 
Fredriksson et al. (2004) report that corruption increases the energy intensity of production in 
a number of sectors on a sample of 12 OECD countries for the period 1982-1996. In another 
study Fredriksson et al. (2003) analyzes the effect from corruption on environmental 
regulations in the United States. The authors use panel data on four industrial sectors on the 
state-level over the years 1977-1987 and find that corruption substantially decreases the 
stringency of regulations.  
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) develop this argument by looking into the 
interacting effect from political instability. Their argument contends that corruption decreases 
the stringency of environmental regulations but that this effect is reduced as the degree of 
political instability increases. They test this argument on a cross-sectional sample of 63 
countries and find – by analyzing a measure of environmental stringency facing producers in 
the agriculture sector – empirical support for their claim.  
Damania et al. (2003) report an effect from trade liberalization on the stringency of 
environmental regulations, measured as the lead content in gasoline, that is contingent on the 
level of corruption. Analyzing a panel of 48 developed and developing countries in the time 
period 1982-1992 they find that high levels of corruption are associated with reduced 
stringency of environmental policy and that the effect from trade policies on an increase in the 
demand for environmental policy is conditional on the level of corruption.  
Morse (2006) reports negative effects on the Environmental Sustainability Index 
from corruption. This trend is consistent with the results reported by Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2006). They find negative effects from corruption in a study of environmental commitment 
in a cross-sectional sample of 62 developed and developing countries. Besides pollution and 
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environmental policies, a number of studies have focused on outcomes in natural resource 
management. Meyer et al. (2003) find that corruption has a small but significantly positive 
effect on the officially reported rate of deforestation in a sample of 117 countries from 1990-
2000. Koyncu and Yilmaz (2009), using three different measurements of corruption and 
official figures on deforestation for three different time periods across a wide sample of 
countries, report that corruption increases the rate of deforestation.  
Wright et al. (2007) come to a similar conclusion using a different measure of forest 
conservation. They analyze satellite-based data on the effectiveness of combating fire in 823 
forest reserves in a number of countries. Their findings indicate that the management of forest 
reserves is more effective in countries with lower levels of corruption. Studies have also 
proposed that biodiversity is affected by corruption, drawing attention to the correlation 
between corruption and the presence of poaching and threat to extinct species (Smith et al. 
2003; Smith et al. 2005; Leader-Williams et al. 2009).  
Other studies report that governance capacity correlate negatively with the 
occurrence of illegal fishing (Agnew et al. 2009; Österblom et al. 2010). A relatively small 
number of studies using qualitative approaches consistently report a negative impact from 
corruption on the effectiveness on natural resource management (Robbins 2000; Smith et al. 
2003; Miller 2011; Pellegrini 2011; Sundström 2013).  
While this literature lend support for the proposed negative environmental effects 
from corruption and bad governance, there exist controversies regarding the issue of 
measurements and the role of economic development. Regarding measurements, Ewers and 
Smith (2007) argue that the relationship between corruption and the environment is in many 
aspects a product of which empirical measure is used by researchers to gauge the wide 
concept of “environmental outcomes”. They argue that environmental degradation, measured 
with “the ecological footprint approach” is insignificantly correlated with national levels of 
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corruption. Reacting to the attention on corruption as an obstacle in conservation Ferraro 
(2005) argue that some of the previous analysis are simplistic. Also Katzner (2005) highlight 
that since corruption has a negative effect on prosperity, this might hamper the possibly 
negative effects on the environment from economic activities2.  
With regards to the role played by economic development Welsch (2004) propose 
that there are two effects from corruption on pollution, one direct positive effect but also one 
indirect, functioning through the suppressing effect on income. As decreased prosperity may 
lead to lower emissions at some income levels and higher emissions at others, this effect is 
more difficult to estimate. The study differs from much of this literature as it analyzes the 
effect of corruption and income on 12 different indicators of environmental performance. 
Using a sample of 122 countries Welsch finds that although pollution is reduced by the 
indirect suppressing effect from corruption on income, the direct and positive effect from 
corruption on pollution is larger.  
As a contrast Cole (2007) builds on this argument, but present somewhat conflicting 
findings. Studying emissions of CO2 and SO2 over the period of 1987-2000 in 94 countries 
Cole reports that the indirect and negative effect from corruption is larger than the positive 
and direct effect. Also Halkos and Tzeremes (2013b) present a nuanced picture of this 
relationship. They perform a nonparametric analysis of the impact from the different 
composite parts of the World Governance Indicators on CO2 emissions over the years 1996-
2010 in the G20 countries. Their findings indicate a nonlinear relationship where increased 
governance quality does not necessarily lead to reduced CO2 emissions. 
To summarize, the theoretical predictions and empirical findings from the literature 
seem to suggest a negative impact from high national levels of corruption on different 
environmental measurements. Given the discussion above we have identified two points of 
                                                        
2
 For an overview of the current debate on the existence of Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKC) the reader is 
referred to Halkos and Tzeremes (2009). 
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critique towards the previous literature that are important for the design of this study. First, 
while some exceptions exists, such as Golden and Min (2012) and Halkos and Tzeremes 
(2013a), most studies within this scholarship focus on nations as the geographical unit and 
seldom studies sub-entities within countries as the unit of analysis. Second, as the review 
above has discussed this literature has often had problems incorporating the role of economic 
development.  
The design of this study attempts to account for some of these aspects by focusing on 
environmental efficiency at the subnational level. We focus on regions in order to account for 
differences within countries, as this limit the risk of ecological fallacies when making 
inferences only based on national values. As previously mentioned, Barrett et al. (2006) noted 
that since the degrees of corruption often vary within countries, the use of single national 
corruption indicators has some inherent problems in explaining the variance in environmental 
outcomes. To account for the role of economic development we focus on environmental 
efficiency, broadly understood as the relationship between desirable economic output and 
undesirable ecological output given the circumstances specified in the sections below. The 
aim of our article is hence to examine the effect of French, German and U.K. NUTS level 1 
regions’ governance quality on their environmental efficiency levels. 
 
3. Data  
 
Our study constructs regional environmental efficiency indicators for 36 NUTS level 
1 regions for France, Germany and the U.K 3  We construct regions’ environmental 
performances following several other studies (Färe et al., 1989; Färe et al., 1996; Chung et al., 
1997; Färe et al., 2004; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2009, 2013a, 2013c) by defining regional 
environmental production as a set of inputs and outputs. The inputs used in our study are the 
                                                        
3 For more information regarding the European NUTS classifications see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction.  
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total regional labor force (for all NACE activities measured in thousands) and regional capital 
stock (in million €).  However since regional capital stock is not available we have calculated 
it following the perpetual inventory method as in several other studies method (Feldstein and 
Foot, 1971; Verstraete, 1976; Epstein and Denny, 1980; Nadiri and Prucha, 1996; 
Terregrossa, 1997). In addition as has been defined by several authors (Färe et al., 1989; Färe 
et al., 1996; Chung et al., 1997) the environmental production is defined by two kinds of 
outputs (the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ outputs). The ‘good’ output in our case is the regional gross 
domestic product (measured at constant prices in million €).  
Furthermore, in our study we use three ‘bad’ (or the undesirable) outputs defining 
regional environmental production process. These are the regional quantities of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) measured in metric tones. López and 
Mitra (2000) points out that “reductions in certain pollutants may simply reflect changes in 
the composition of pollution. Lower emissions of a particular pollutant may involve increases 
in other pollutants” (p. 138). We therefore argue that it is highly beneficial study more than 
just one pollutant and therefore use data on three different types of emissions. In our analysis 
the inputs and outputs used are referred to the year 20094 and they have been collected from 
three different regional databases (EUROSTAT 5 , OECD 6  and European Environmental 
Agency7). 
Additionally, since we investigate the effect of regions’ government quality on their 
environmental performance a governance indicator has been used in our analysis. Although 
there exist numerous indicators on governance and the levels of corruption on the country 
level, few measurements exist that capture regional differences in this aspect. To date, the 
                                                        
4 Regional pollutant data are scarce and therefore our study is limited only for the year 2009 and for 36 NUTS 
level 1 regions for which the data are available. 
5 Available from: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/regional_statistics/data/main_tables. 
6 Available from: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REG_LAB_TL3 
7 Available from: http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/. 
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most comprehensive governance indicator on the sub-national level is the European Quality 
of Government Index (EQI), constructed by a research team at the Quality of Government 
Institute, at the University of Gothenburg, with funding from the European Commission (see 
Charron et al. 2011). In this project, the researchers issued a survey during the year 2009 of 
around 34 000 citizens in 18 countries on three types of public services (health care, education 
and law enforcement). The participants were surveyed on how they would evaluate these 
services numerically according to their quality, impartiality and corruption. The questionnaire 
consisted of 16 questions related to these themes of good governance, which were then 
compiled into a sub-national index.  
To additionally introduce a country context to the index, the researchers merged the 
regional scores with external measures of governance. By introducing a factor accounting for 
these regions’ deviation from the country average of the World Bank’s World Government 
Indicator (WGI) the researchers received the EQI. In this sense the measure gauges both 
political and administrative forms of corruption (For a more detailed description on the survey 
and the creation of the index, see Charron et al. 20138).  
In all, the index measures the quality, impartiality and corruption of government in 
these subnational units, where higher values equal better governance and lower levels more 
partiality, ineffectiveness and corruption in government (see also Charron and Lapuente 
2013). Specifically, the index scores of the EQI are standardized and set so that 0 is the value 
for region in the original sample with the lowest quality of government and 100 is the value 
for the region with the highest. In total, the EQI cover 172 regions. Due to the limitations of 
the availability of regional figures on pollutants, as described previously, we include 36 
regions from the three countries in our analysis. The descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in our analysis are presented in Table 1. 
                                                        
8 For extensive sensitivity tests between the regional measure of quality of government and national WGI scores, 
see Charron (2010). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
  Capital Stock (000') Labour force (000') Current GDP (millions €) CH4 (in tonnes) CO2 (in tonnes) N2O (in tonnes) EQI 
  All regions-NUTS 1  (36) 
Mean 24000456.15 2625.814 176290.056 27877.611 27566272.14 2143.539 80.594 
Std 14377375 1722.034 136937.673 37669.065 41510036.02 3342.193 5.872 
Min 7391667.206 284.7 26829 124 2419000 38.1 67.947 
Max 62098956.42 7974.6 541880 200085 196817797 15300 91.673 
  French regions-NUTS 1 (8) 
Mean 23942759.8 3195.488 232649.25 20906.875 16286500 2738.938 73.121 
Std 14329030.77 1171.722 136077.618 19319.067 8738085.962 2691.056 3.337 
Min 8884885.483 1506.3 96606 7124 6212000 150.7 67.947 
Max 54444488.9 5223.1 541880 67026 26275000 7824.7 77.329 
  German regions-NUTS 1 (16) 
Mean 20191758.59 2388.075 152025.063 19382.813 28032799.81 2480.7 83.331 
Std 15922445.97 2255.087 156891.424 48607.537 46513297.8 4356.985 4.07 
Min 7391667.206 284.7 26829 124 2419000 38.1 76.314 
Max 62098956.42 7974.6 531242 200085 196817797 15300 91.673 
  UK regions-NUTS 1 (12) 
Mean 29117183.8 2563.017 171070.583 43851.167 34464083.33 1297.058 81.925 
Std 11474887.53 1142.142 105449.422 25235.982 48363040 1960.138 5.156 
Min 8607011.688 783.5 47312 1601 4293000 59.7 72.339 
Max 50742262.77 4411.2 430882 85467 178180000 6999 89.604 
 
 
4. Methods  
 
4.1 Measurement of regions’ environmental performance levels 
Recently Halkos and Tzeremes (2013a) introduced an innovative application of the model 
proposed by Färe and Grosskopf (2004) based on the probabilistic characterization of 
directional distance function (Simar and Vanhems, 2012). In our case we apply the same 
approach in order to measure the effect of French, German and U.K. NUTS level 1 regions’ 
governance quality on their environmental efficiency levels. In order to characterize regions’ 
environmental production technology let ( )1,..., NNx x += ∈ℜx  denote an input vector which 
can produce a set of undesirable (bad) outputs 1( ,..., )
J
Ju u += ∈ℜu  and desirable (good) 
outputs ( )1,..., Mv vΜ += ∈ℜv . Then the environmental production technology can be defined 
as: 
( ) ( ){ }, ,  can produce ,=P u v x x u x                    (1) 
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Moreover, in order to determine the environmental production technology several 
assumptions needs to be taken, following Shephard (1970), and Färe and Primont (1995). 
Therefore, we assume that the output sets are closed and bounded and that inputs are freely 
disposal. In addition P  can be an environmental output set if: 
1. ( ), ∈v u P  and 0 1θ≤ ≤  then ( ), ,θ θ ∈v u x P  (i.e. the outputs are weakly disposable) and 
2. ( ), , ∈v u x P , 0=u  implies that 0=v  (i.e. the null jointness assumption of good and bad 
outputs). 
Moreover data envelopment analysis (DEA) framework is used in order to formalize 
regions’ environmental technology. For that case let us assume k regions under examination 
whereas the observed activities can be defined as ( ), ,k k kv u x  where 1,...,k K= . Then the 
environmental output can be formalized as: 
( )
}
1
1
1
, , : , 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
0, 1,...,
K
k km m
k
K
k kj j
k
K
k kn n
k
k
v v m M
u u j J
x x n N
k K
ω
ω
ω
ω
∧
=
=
=

= ≥ =

= =
≤ =
≥ =
∑
∑
∑
P v u x
                   (2) 
,  1,...,k k Kω =   indicate the intensity variables which are not negative and imply constant 
return to scale.9  The inequality in the good outputs and the equality in the bad outputs help us 
to impose the weak disposability assumption and only strong disposability of good outputs. 
However the null-jointness is imposed by the following restrictions on bad outputs: 
                                                        
9 In our case the regional environmental performance follows the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS). 
According to Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2012: 802) from an ecological perspective, economic activity is commonly 
characterised by constant returns to scale. According to Sahoo and Tone (2013) the convexity postulate can 
assume away some important technological features.Several authors therefore suggest that a convexity axiom 
can be dropped (Scarf 1981a, 1981b, 1986; Kuosmanen 2003; Tone and Sahoo, 2003; Zelenyuk and Zheka 
2006). Still, if a researcher wants to impose the convexity postulate in this model, it is suggested to follow the 
DEA modelling remarks raised by Kuosmanen (2005), Färe and Grosskopf (2009) and Kuosmanen and 
Podinovski (2009). A similar model to the one applied here when assuming the convexity axiom can be found in 
Halkos and Tzeremes (2013c).  
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1
1
0, 1,..., ,
0, 1,..., .
K
kjk
J
kjj
u j J
u k K
=
=
> =
> =
∑
∑
                     (3). 
Following Chung et al. (1997) we apply the directional distance function approach in 
order to be able to reduce bad outputs and expand good outputs. For that purpose we use a 
direction vector ( ),v u= −g g g , where 1v =g  and 1u− = −g 10. The efficiency score for a region 
'k can then be obtained from: 
( ) ( ){ }' ' ' ' ' ', , ; , sup , ,k k k k k kv u v uD β β β= + − ∈v u x g g v g u g x P                   (4). 
The additional DEA estimator of (4) can then be obtained as: 
( )' ' '
'
1
'
1
'
1
, , ; , max
. . , 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
0, 1,..., .
k k k
v u
K
k km k m vm
k
K
k kj k j uj
k
K
k kn k n
k
k
D
s t v v g m M
u u g j J
x x
k K
β
ω β
ω β
ω
ω
∧
=
=
=
=
≥ + =
= − =
≤
≥ =
∑
∑
∑
v u x g g
                  (5). 
Efficiency is next indicated when ( )' ' ', , ; , 0k k k v uD
∧
=v u x g g  and inefficiency 
by ( )' ' ', , ; , 0k k k v uD
∧
>v u x g g .  
4.2 Conditional directional distance functions under environmental technology 
Following Daraio and Simar (2005), who extend the probabilistic formulation of the 
production process firstly introduced by Cazals et al. (2002) 11 , let the joint probability 
                                                        
10 This is the most common assumption made for directional distance functions when measuring environmental 
efficiency levels. However, different directions can be chosen in order for the researcher to test the 
environmental efficiency under different environmental policy scenarios (see among others Picazo-Tadeo et al., 
2012). 
11 For the theoretical background and the asymptotic properties of nonparametric conditional efficiency 
measures see Jeong et al. (2010).  
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measure of the environmental production to be defined as ( ), ,v u x  and the joint probability 
function of ( ), , .,.H v u x  can be defined as: 
( ) ( ), , , , Prob , ,H x v u x v u= ≤ ≥ ≥v u x x v u                    (6).  
In addition the following decomposition can be obtained as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,, , Prob , Prob ,H x v u v u x x S v u x F x= ≥ ≥ ≤ ≤ =v u x xv u xv u x x                  (7),  
where  
( ) ( )ProbF x x= ≤x x  and ( ) ( ), , Prob ,S v u x v u x= ≥ ≥ ≤v u x v u x . 
In addition let ( )1,..., rrz z R= ∈z denote the exogenous factor to the production process 
(in our case is the regional governance quality-EQI). Then equation (6) becomes: 
( ) ( ), , , , Prob , ,H x v u z x v u z= ≤ ≥ ≥ =v u x z x v u z                   (8),  
which complete characterizes the regional environmental production process. Then, in the 
same lines to Daraio and Simar (2005, 2006, 2007), the following decomposition can be 
derived: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,
, ,
, , Prob , , Prob
, ,
H x v u z v u x z x z
S v u x z F x z
= ≥ ≥ ≤ = ≤
=
v u x z
v u x z x z
v u x z x
                 (9). 
The estimator of the conditional survival function introduced above can then be obtained 
from: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
, ,
1
, , ,
, ,
,
n
h ii
n
h ii
I v u x K z
S v u x z
I x K z
∧
=
=
≥ ≥ ≤
=
≤
∑
∑
v u x z
v u x z
x z
                (10), 
where ( ) ( )( )1, , /h i iK z h K z h−=z z  with ( ).K  being a univariate kernel defined on a compact 
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support (Epanechnikov in our case) and h is the appropriate bandwidth calculated following 
Bădin et al. (2010)12. 
By following Simar and Vanhems (2012) the probabilistic characterization of the directional 
distance function, measuring environmental efficiency, will then take the form of: 
( ) ( ){ }' ' ' ' ' ', ,, , ; , sup 0 , , 0k k k k k kv u v uD Hβ β β= > + − >x v uv u x g g v g u g x                (11), 
In addition the conditional form of the model will take the form of: 
( ) ( ){ }' ' ' ' ' ', ,, , ; , sup 0 , , 0k k k k k kv u v uD H zβ β β= > + − = >v u x zv u x g g z v g u g x z                  (12). 
Finally, the DEA program for the environmental efficiency score for a region 'k  when 
using the conditional output oriented directional distance function can be calculated as: 
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              (13) 
As previously shown, environmental efficient regions under the effect of region’s 
governance quality level will be indicated when ( )' ' ', , ; , 0k k k v uD
∧
=v u x g g z  and inefficient 
regions will respectively be specified by values of ( )' ' ', , ; , 0k k k v uD
∧
>v u x g g z 13.  
                                                        
12 The calculation of bandwidth by Bădin et al. (2010) is based on the Least Squares Cross Validation (LSCV) 
criterion introduced by Hall et al. (2004) and Li and Racine (2007).  
13 As in the study of Halkos and Tzeremes (2013c) we are using efficiency estimates rather that inefficiencies by 
adopting the transformation by Chung et al. (1997) and Chambers et al. (1998). According to Podinovski and 
Kuosmanen (2011) the conventional radial Farrell input and output efficiency measures can be obtained as 
special cases of the directional distance functions. 
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As can be realised the regional environmental performance levels obtained from 
equation (13) are different compared to the regional environmental performance levels 
derived from equation (5) since the exogenous variable z  is assumed that influences directly 
the shape of regions’ environmental production frontier (i.e., the conditional directional 
distance function in (13) does not assume a separability condition). Therefore regions’ 
environmental performance levels obtained are determined by the regions’ capital stock, 
regions’ labor force, regions’ GDP levels, from regions’ pollutant levels (CO2, CH4 and N2O) 
and from regions’ governance quality.  
4.3 Determining the effect of regions’ governance quality 
In order to identify the effect of regions’ governance quality levels ( z ) on their 
environmental efficiency (EE) levels without specifying in prior any functional relationship, 
our paper applies a nonparametric regression in the principles of Daraio and Simar (2005, 
2006, 2007). When z is univariate (as in our case), a scatter plot of the ratio 
( )
( )
' ' '
' ' '
, , ; ,
, , ; ,
k k k
v u
k k k
v u
D
Q
D
∧
∧ =
v u x g g z
v u x g g
 against z and its smooth nonparametric regression line would be 
able to describe the effect of z  on regions’ environmental efficiency levels. Let the 
nonparametric regression smoothing be presented as: 
( ) , 1,...,k k kQ g k Kε= + =z                  (14), 
where kε is the error term with ( ) 0k kE ε =z , and g is the mean regression function, since 
( ) ( )k k kE Q g=z z . Then the nonparametric regression estimator introduced from Nadaraya 
(1964) and Watson (1964) can be obtained as: 
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In addition ( ).Κ  is the Gaussian kernel and h represents the bandwidth calculated by the least 
squares cross-validation data driven method as suggested by Hall et al. (2004). Based on a 
recent study by Halkos and Tzeremes (2013d) we follow a bootstrap based significance test 
for nonparametric regression as has been introduced from several authors (Racine 1997; 
Racine et al. 2006; Li and Racine 2007) in order to compute a significance level of the 
observed effect of the EQI on regions’ environmental performance levels. 
Finally, since we use output oriented conditional and unconditional distance functions 
according to Daraio and Simar (2005, 2006, 2007) an increasing nonparametric regression 
line between Q and EQI will indicate a favorable exogenous factor, where as a decreasing line 
will indicate an unfavorable factor. 
 
 
5. Empirical results  
 
Table 2 presents the analytical results derived from the unconditional 
( ), , ; ,v uD  v u x g g and conditional ( ), , ; ,v uD  v u x g g z  measure for the 36 regions in focus. Under 
the unconditional measures it is reported that 14 regions are environmental efficient (i.e. 
efficiency score equals to 1). More analytically one efficient region is reported from France 
(Île de France), ten regions are reported as efficient from Germany (Baden Wuttemberg, 
Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommen, North Rhine Westphalia, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein) and three regions from the U.K. 
(Northeast England, London and South West England). The descriptive statistics suggest that 
German regions report, in average terms,  the highest environmental efficiency scores (0.882) 
whereas the U.K. regions the lowest (0.708).  The French regions appear to have regional 
environmental efficiency values (in average terms) between these two ‘extremes’.  
Furthermore, Table 2 presents the conditional measures of regions’ environmental 
performance levels. Under the conditional measures regions’ environmental efficiencies are 
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subject to the effect of their governance quality levels. In this case 16 regions are reported as 
environmental efficient. More analytically, from France one region is environmental efficient 
(Île de France) from Germany 11 regions (Baden Wuttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, 
Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommen, North Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, 
Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony) and from the U.K. four regions (London, 
South West England, South East England and Northwest England).  
 
Table 2: Conditional and unconditional regional environmental performance levels 
Region 
 ( ), , ; ,v uD v u x g g   ( ), , ; ,v uD v u x g g z     ( ), , ; ,v uD v u x g g   ( ), , ; ,v uD v u x g g z  
Île de France 1.000 1.000 All regions-NUTS 1  (36) 
Bassin Parisien 0.593 0.594 Mean 0.797 0.807 
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.701 0.594 Std 0.182 0.195 
Est 0.622 0.596 Min 0.545 0.515 
Ouest 0.804 0.804 Max 1.000 1.000 
Sud-Ouest 0.846 0.846 French regions-NUTS 1 (8) 
Centre-Est 0.863 0.882 Mean 0.763 0.745 
Méditerranée 0.673 0.640 Std 0.139 0.159 
Baden Wuttemberg 1.000 1.000 Min 0.593 0.594 
Bavaria 1.000 1.000 Max 1.000 1.000 
Berlin 1.000 1.000 German regions-NUTS 1 (16) 
Brandenburg 0.584 0.571 Mean 0.882 0.897 
Bremen 1.000 1.000 Std 0.174 0.174 
Hamburg 1.000 1.000 Min 0.545 0.545 
Hessen 0.909 0.897 Max 1.000 1.000 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 1.000 1.000 UK regions-NUTS 1 (12) 
Lower Saxony 0.711 1.000 Mean 0.708 0.728 
North Rhine Westphalia 1.000 1.000 Std 0.179 0.205 
Rhineland-Palatinate 1.000 1.000 Min 0.569 0.515 
Saarland 1.000 1.000 Max 1.000 1.000 
Saxony 0.642 0.621    
Saxony-Anhalt 0.545 0.545    
Schleswig-Holstein 1.000 1.000    
Thuringia 0.721 0.721    
Northeast England 1.000 0.515    
Northwest England 0.591 1.000    
Yorkshire-Humber 0.601 0.562    
East Midland England 0.569 0.556    
West Midland England 0.593 0.593    
East of England 0.611 0.611    
London 1.000 1.000    
South East England 0.621 1.000    
South West England 1.000 1.000    
Wales 0.632 0.623    
Scotland 0.586 0.584    
N. Ireland 0.687 0.687       
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Again as in the case for unconditional measures German regions are report to have in 
average terms highest environmental performance (0.897) whereas the U.K. regions are report 
to have the lowest environmental efficiency performance (0.728). The paradox under the 
unconditional and conditional measures between the French and the U.K. regions is the fact 
that even though more U.K. regions are reported to bee environmental efficient in average 
terms French regions have overall higher environmental performances. This is mainly due to 
the higher standard deviation value of the reported efficiencies among the U.K. regions. This 
result is also confirmed for NUTS 2 level in the study of Halkos and Tzeremes (2013a) 
indicating a high variance in the environmental efficiency of the U.K. regions.    
Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates the kernel density functions of regions’ 
environmental efficiency scores for the unconditional (solid line) and unconditional measures 
(dashed line)14 . More analytically sub-Figure 1a provides the distribution of all regions’ 
environmental efficiency levels. As can be observed we have a picture of twin-peak both for 
conditional and unconditional environmental efficiency scores. The first peak is at 0.6 and the 
second at 1. Therefore we can assume that there are two groups among the 36 regions, which 
indicate a potential environmental efficiency polarization.  Similar result can be observed for 
the German regions (sub-Figure 1c) and for the U.K. regions (sub-figure 1d).  
However for the case of German regions the probability of regions to have 
environmental efficiency scores equal to 1 is extremely higher compared to environmental 
efficiency values equal to 0.6. However this comes in contrast for the U.K. regions, in which 
the opposite phenomenon can be observed (analogously with the German regions). Finally, 
for the case of French regions (sub-Figure 1b) the unconditional environmental efficiency 
scores present a platykurtic distribution of the estimated environmental efficiency scores. 
However, for the conditional case again the twin-peak phenomenon is observed for two 
                                                        
14 For the construction of the density plots we have used the ‘normal reference rule-ofthumb’ approach for 
bandwidth selection (Silverman 1986) and a second order Gaussian kernel. 
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regional environmental efficiency scores (0.5 and 0.9). This indicates that there is a 
polarization in those environmental efficiency values of the French regions when the quality 
of governance is taken into account.  
 
Figure 1: Kernel density functions of regions’ environmental efficiencies derived from 
conditional and unconditional directional distance functions using Gaussian kernel and the 
appropriate bandwidth. 
 
The results presented in Figure 2 illustrate the effect of regions’ governance quality 
levels on their obtained environmental efficiency scores following the visualization approach 
by Daraio and Simar (2005, 2006, 2007). Moreover we follow the nonparametric regression 
significance test proposed by several authors (Racine 1997; Racine et al. 2006; Li and Racine 
1a  1b  
1c  1d  
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2007) in order to compute a significance level of the observed effect of regions’ governance 
quality levels on their environmental efficiency scores.15 In all four cases presented in Figure 
2 we obtained p-values less than 0.05 indicating a statistical significance of EQI explaining 
regions’ environmental efficiency.16 More analytically, sub-Figure 2a presents the effect of 
EQI for all the regions. As can be observed there is an increasing nonparametric line up to a 
certain EQI level (the value 85 on the scale of EQI; where 0 is the European region with the 
worst value and 100 is the value of the region with the best), indicating a positive effect on 
regions’ environmental efficiency levels.  
However after that point the effect becomes negative. For the case of French regions 
we observe an increasing line indicating that when the EQI increases French regions’ 
environmental efficiency levels are also increasing. For the case of German regions the 
picture is completely different. It appears that the effect of EQI is positive up to a certain EQI 
level (83), which after that point the effect becomes slightly negative. Finally, for the case of 
the U.K. it is observed a slight negative effect of EQI up to 81. However the effect becomes 
positive up to 85 and then it turns again to negative. As can be clearly realised there is a 
nonlinear relationship between regions’ governance quality levels and their environmental 
performances.   
The results from our analysis suggest that the relationship between governance quality 
and regional environmental efficiency is non-linear and not uniform across the three different 
countries. Intuitively it is difficult to interpret these findings. The fact that we observe a 
nonlinear relationship between EQI and regions’ environmental performance suggests that 
there are possibly other maybe “more influential” factors in regions and societies which after 
a certain point play a greater role than the overall regional institutional arrangements. Hence 
there are potentially interacting effects from omitted variables that future research might 
                                                        
15 For an extensive application of this test on environmental efficiency scores see Halkos and Tzeremes (2013d). 
16 In addition, the dotted lines in Figure 2 indicate the bootstrapped pointwise error bounds (Racine 2008). 
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address. With regards to the observed differences between the three countries one possible 
explanation is that the institutional context of these countries explain this pattern. While it is 
not within the scope of this paper to disentangle this in detail, we observe that other authors 
have suggested some differences between these countries that might be important. For 
example, there are differences in the national administrative arrangements on the 
implementation of EU environmental policies between the U.K. and Germany (Knill and 
Lenschow 1998). Another potential explanation could be the corporatist structure of the three 
countries, as this has been said to influence environmental quality (e.g. Crepaz 1995; 
Neumayer 2003; Scruggs 1999).17  
 
Figure 2: The effect of regions’ governance quality on their environmental performance levels  
 
 
                                                        
17 “...Corporatism refers to a system of interest representation in which a small number of strategic actors 
organized associations, represent large parts of the population in an encompassing fashion...” (Crepaz 1995: 
391-392). “...The pluralist form of interest representation is characterised by a large number of atomistic 
interest groups which are in a competitive struggle over access to the legislative process, using 'pressure 
politics...” (Crepaz 1995: 392). 
2a  2b  
2c  2d  
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For instance, according to Crepaz (1995) Germany is a country with corporatist 
tendencies, whereas the U.K. tends to be more pluralist. Therefore it could possible be the 
case that this factor would have some explanatory power for the observed variance. However, 
we would again stress that there could be other possible explanations of importance. Using 
these results as a stepping-stone for identifying potential venues for future research we 
believe it would be highly relevant for researchers to focus on why the relationship between 
corruption and environmental outcomes possibly differ across countries when analysing on 
sub-national units. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we measure for the first time the effect of regional governance quality on 
the environmental performance levels of 36 regions at the NUTS 1 level in France, Germany 
and the U.K. In order to measure regions’ environmental performance we follow the same 
estimators as in the study by Halkos and Tzeremes (2013a) under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale. The methodological approach chosen is an application of the conditional 
directional distance functions introduced by Simar and Vanhems (2012). To our knowledge 
this study is the first to examine empirically the link between environmental performance and 
governance quality at a regional level. The results provided compliment to several other pre-
mentioned studies examining empirically and theoretically the link between governance 
quality and environmental outcomes at the national level.  
Our findings suggest a nonlinear relationship between regions government quality (the 
EQI index) and their environmental efficiency levels. With an exception for the French 
regions it appears that higher EQI values is not linearly associated with higher regional 
environmental efficiency levels. This particular result could have broader implications as it 
suggest that higher governance quality will not always result in increased environmental 
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efficiency. Moreover, this finding, alongside with the high environmental efficiency 
variations (with and without the effect of EQI) among the 36 regions, suggests that other 
factors rather than regional institutional arrangements may influence more regions’ 
environmental efficiency levels. Our results thus contribute empirically to the scholarly 
discussion and to our theoretical understanding of the link between governance quality and 
environmental outcomes. 
Following several authors (e.g. Crepaz 1995; Struggs 1999; Neumayer 2003) one 
potential explanation for why we do not observe uniform effects from EQI in the three 
countries in focus may be based on the argument that the level of corporatism/pluralism in a 
society could influence regional environmental politics and the implementation of 
environmental policies. However, to examine the explanatory power of this or other potential 
arguments that can explain the variance we observe is beyond the scope of this study. Instead 
we believe that this topic may very well be the subject for future research. In this point it must 
be mentioned that regional data availability is a problem for empirical research and can 
significantly narrow down the researchers’ options in hand. An increased availability of 
regional data on environmental indicators would benefit the research community as a whole 
and further enable us to inform our understanding of the relationship between governance and 
the environment.  
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